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Abstract: Preferences are fundamental constructs in all models of economic and political 
behavior  and  important  precursors  to  many  lifetime  outcomes.  Twin  studies  suggest  that 
preferences are heritable, but twin-based heritability estimates remain controversial. Here, 
with  a  new  sample  of  comprehensively-genotyped  subjects  with  data  on  political  and 
economic preferences, as well as income and educational attainment, we use genome-wide 
data to estimate the proportion of variation in these traits explained by common SNPs. The 
overall pattern of results is consistent with findings for other complex traits: (1) the estimated 
fraction of phenotypic variation that can ultimately be explained by dense SNP arrays is 
approximately half the heritability as estimated using twin and family studies; and (2) GWAS 
and prediction analyses reveal that many common SNPs with large explanatory power for 
these traits are unlikely to exist. These findings have implications for evaluating the extent to 
which the potential benefits of molecular genetic data in the social sciences will be borne out 
in the near future. The results are also useful for evaluating existing published associations in 
candidate gene studies of economic and political phenotypes. We propose some constructive 
responses to the inferential challenges posed by the small explanatory power of individual 
SNPs. 
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Introduction 
Preferences are fundamental constructs in most theories of economic and political behaviour. 
Risk aversion, patience, fair-mindedness, and trust are considered particularly fundamental 
preferences within economics because they explain a wide range of behaviours, and political 
ideology  plays  a  similar  role  within  political  science.  For  example,  measures  of  risk 
preferences predict diverse risky behaviours, such as smoking, drinking, and holding stocks 
rather than bonds (Barsky et al., 1997; Dohmen et al., 2011). Experimentally-elicited patience 
predicts  body mass index, smoking behaviour, and frequency of exercise (Chabris  et  al., 
2008), as well as credit card borrowing (Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Political preferences 
similarly  predict  a  wide  range  of  political  behaviours,  including  voting  (Jost,  2006)  and 
giving monetary campaign contributions (Morton and Cameron, 1992), as well as campaign 
activities like volunteering, attending rallies, and displaying yard signs (Claassen, 2007). 
Behaviour genetic studies, beginning with the seminal work of Martin et al. (1986), have 
suggested that some of the variation in political and economic preferences can be statistically 
accounted for by genetic differences (Alford et al., 2005; Cesarini et al., 2009; Hatemi et al., 
2007, 2011; Zhong et al., 2009; Zyphur et al., 2009). However, these conclusions continue to 
be  contested  (e.g.,  Charney,  2008).  Critics  point  out  that  the  twin-based  estimates  of 
“heritability”—which compare the correlation of an outcome across monozygotic (MZ) twin 
pairs  with  that  correlation  across  dizygotic  (DZ)  twin  pairs—rely  on  strong  assumptions 
which  render  it  difficult  to  draw  any  definite  conclusions.  For  example,  one  criticism 
sometimes levelled against twin studies is that the similarity of MZ twins may be inflated due 
to failure of the equal-environment assumption (Stenberg, 2011), a bias which could cause 
heritability estimates to be positive even if the true value were zero. 
Other  researchers,  along  with  various  funding  agencies,  have  embraced  the  twin-based 
heritability estimates as fuelling their enthusiasm regarding the transformative promise of 
molecular genetic data for social science research. By indicating that there is some variance 
in  social  science  phenotypes  explainable  by  genes,  the  heritability  estimates  imply  that 
predictive  genetic markers exist and could,  in  principle, be identified.  If specific  genetic 
markers can be identified that are associated with a preference, then it might be possible to 
predict a given individual’s preference without access to any phenotypic data (a feat that 
cannot be accomplished just using heritability estimates). Identifying such predictive markers 4 
 
may shed light on the biological pathways underlying preferences and ultimately help us 
better understand how genes affect outcomes (Jencks, 1980). Even more exciting for many 
social scientists, if a set of genetic markers is sufficiently predictive, then these markers could 
be used in social science research as covariates, as instrumental variables* (Davey Smith and 
Ebrahim, 2003; Ding et al., 2006), or as factors for identifying at-risk populations who might 
benefit from policy interventions.  
Even if social-science traits are heritable, the extent to which these promises of molecular 
genetic  data  will  be  fulfilled  for  a  given  trait  hinges  crucially  on  its  “molecular  genetic 
architecture,” i.e., the joint distribution of effect sizes and allele frequencies of the causal 
genetic  markers  (Benjamin,  2010;  Beauchamp  et  al.,  2011).  The  molecular  genetic 
architecture determines the difficulty with which the genetic variants associated with a trait 
can be identified and what sample sizes will be required. It also determines the out-of-sample 
aggregate predictability that can be derived from a set of SNPs considered jointly.  
 
In this paper, we use a new sample of comprehensively-genotyped subjects from the Swedish 
Twin Registry who were recently administered, as part of a survey called SALTY, a rich set 
of  questions  measuring  economic  and  political  preferences.  We  study  four  fundamental 
economic  preferences—risk  aversion,  patience,  trust  and  fair-mindedness—and  five 
dimensions of political preferences, derived from a factor analysis of a comprehensive battery 
of attitudinal items. The five attitudinal dimensions are immigration/crime, economic policy, 
environmentalism, feminism, and foreign policy. 
 
We  also  study  educational  attainment  and  income  because  much  is  known  about  their 
heritability not only from twin studies (Taubman, 1976), but unlike the preference measures, 
also from behaviour-genetic estimates that use other pedigree relationships (Björklund, Jäntti 
and Solon, 2005; Cesarini, 2010). Educational attainment and income are available for a 
larger  sample  of  genotyped  individuals  because  they  are  obtained  from  administrative 
records. For comparability with previous work and with our other estimates, we report twin-
based estimates of heritability from this new sample, but our main focus is on using the 
whole-genome data to (1) provide new evidence regarding heritability as estimated directly 
from the genetic data, and (2) learn about the genetic architecture of these traits. 
First, we employ a recently-developed method (Visscher et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010) that 
uses the whole-genome data to estimate a lower bound of the heritability of these traits. The 5 
 
technique—which  we  will  call  Genomic-Relatedness-Matrix  Restricted  Maximum 
Likelihood (GREML)—has been applied to both height (Yang et al., 2010) and intelligence 
(Davies et al., 2011) but never before to economic and political phenotypes. Since these 
lower-bound  estimates  of  heritability  do  not  rest  on  the  same  assumptions  used  in  twin 
studies, they provide an additional source of evidence regarding heritability. The method is 
instead  based  on  a  different  key  assumption:  among  individuals  who  are  unrelated—i.e., 
distantly  related,  since  all  humans  are  related  to  some  extent—environmental  factors  are 
uncorrelated  with  differences  in  the  degree  of  genetic  relatedness.  Crucially,  genetic 
relatedness is directly estimated from the single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) data, unlike 
in behaviour-genetic studies, where expected relatedness is inferred from the family pedigree. 
Some of the concern about behaviour-genetic studies is that expected relatedness could be 
correlated with environmental factors that are not endogenous to genotype. Since there is 
more random variation in the realized degree of genome sharing relative to the expected 
degree as the expected relatedness declines (Visscher, 2009), environmental confounding is 
less likely to drive estimates that are based on realized relatedness among individuals whose 
expected relatedness is negligible. 
 
Under the key assumption of no environmental confounding, an estimate of heritability can 
be obtained by examining how the correlation in phenotype between pairs of individuals 
relates to the realized genetic distance between those individuals. The resulting estimate is a 
lower bound for heritability for two reasons: (1) because the method assumes that genetic 
effects are additive, it attributes any epistatic or dominance effects to the environment; and 
(2)  the  estimated  relationship  between  phenotype  and  genetic  relatedness  is  attenuated 
because relatedness is measured imperfectly; the common SNPs typed on the genotyping chip 
capture much but not all of the variation in genetic variation across individuals (Yang et al., 
2010).   
 
Second, we use the whole-genome data to explore the molecular genetic architecture of the 
phenotypes. Specifically, we estimate heritability using relatedness measured separately by 
chromosome to test how evenly distributed the genetic effects are across the genome. We 
supplement these results with a standard genome-wide association studies (GWAS) for each 
trait, in which individual SNPs are tested for association with the outcome of interest. Finally, 
we also perform a risk prediction exercise in which we randomly split the dataset into a 
discovery and a validation sample. We use a pruned set of SNPs from the discovery sample 6 
 
to build a predictor and then examine to what extent the predictor is correlated with the 
outcome  in  the  validation  sample.  Similar  approaches  have  been  applied  in  the  study  of 
schizophrenia (Purcell, 2009), height (Lango Allan et al., 2010) and intelligence (Davies et 
al., 2011), but none of these methods have been applied to economic or political preferences. 
 
Results 
We  began  by  computing  the  sibling  correlations  for  all  eleven  variables  and  the  retest 
reliabilities for the nine preference measures.   Table 1 reports the results. In total, the sample 
of SALTY respondents is comprised of 1,143 complete MZ pairs (464 of them male); 1,237 
complete, same-sex DZ pairs (502 of them female); 1,114 complete, opposite-sex DZ pairs; 
and 4,394 singletons. A total of 491 respondents answered the survey twice, allowing us to 
estimate  retest  reliabilities  for  the  preference  measures.  The  sibling  correlations  for  the 
SALTY questions on discounting (Cesarini et al., 2011), political preferences (Oskarsson et 
al., 2010), and risk aversion (Beauchamp et al., 2011) have previously been analysed and are 
reproduced  here  to  facilitate  comparison  with  the  remaining  results.  The  income  and 
educational  attainment  variables  we  used  have  also  been  previously  studied  in  partially 
overlapping  samples  (Björklund,  Jäntti  and  Solon,  2005;  Cesarini,  2010).  We  report  the 
correlations in educational attainment and the natural logarithm of earnings averaged over the 
1985 and 1990 censuses. The implied heritabilities of the economic preferences are typically 
in the vicinity of 30% and the estimates for political preferences are typically around 40%. 
The  final  column  of  the  table  shows  the  estimated  reliability  of  each  of  the  preferences 
phenotypes.  These  reliabilities  are  estimated  from  a  subset  of  respondents  who  were 
administered the survey twice. 
We estimated, for each trait, the proportion  of phenotypic variation accounted for by all 
SNPs, following the method of Yang et al. (2010). These lower-bound heritability estimates 
for the nine traits are reported in Table 2. For economic preferences, only one of the four 
variables, trust, is borderline significant (p = 0.047), with the point estimate suggesting that 
the  common  SNPs  explain  over  twenty  percent  of  phenotypic  variation.  The  remaining 
effects  are  lower,  in  one  case  zero,  and  not  statistically  distinguishable  from  zero.  For 
political preferences, three out of the five derived attitudinal dimensions have non-zero point 
estimates. These estimates are 0.203 (p = 0.079) for immigration/crime, 0.344 (p =0.012) for 
economic policy, and 0.353(p = 0.001) for foreign policy attitudes. Evidently the estimates 7 
 
are noisier for phenotypes with lower retest reliabilities. Keeping in mind that these are noisy 
and are lower bounds, the estimates taken as a whole are consistent with low to moderate 
heritabilities  for  these  traits.  The  cumulative  effect  of  the  SNPs  is  much  more  precisely 
estimated  for  educational  attainment,  because  this  phenotype  is  available  for  all  the 
genotyped individuals in the sample, not just the survey respondents. For this phenotype, the 
larger  sample  decreases  the  standard  error  of  the  estimates  substantially,  while  the  point 
estimate of 0.191 (p = 0.001) is only somewhat higher than the average point estimate for the 
other phenotypes. These analyses are all based on mixed-sex samples, controlling for sex, 
age, and the first ten principal components of the genotypic data. For our last variable, log 
earnings, we restrict the sample to males only and report additional specifications for women 
and the pooled samples in the Supplementary Online Appendix. § Our point estimate for log 
earnings in males is 0.061 (p = 0.313). In the Supplementary Online Materials, we show that 
when we pool men and women, the point estimate is 0.084 (p = 0.085). 
We also conduct the analysis separately by chromosome, as in Davies et al. (2011). Between 
unrelated individuals, realized relatedness is random and independent across chromosomes, 
and the expected relatedness measured from any chromosome is zero. If, rather than being 
concentrated in a particular location, the genetic variation that predicts a trait were uniformly 
distributed across the genome, then greater realized relatedness from any given chromosome 
will predict greater phenotypic similarly, and this association will be stronger from longer 
chromosomes.  The  bottom  row  of  Table  2  shows  the  estimated  correlation  between 
chromosomal length, measured in centimorgans, and the fraction of variance explained by the 
estimates  of  realized  relatedness  estimated  using  only  data  from  one  chromosome.  The 
correlation is positive for 8 out of 11 phenotypes. Davies et al. (2011) report an analogous 
positive correlation for cognitive ability and interpret it as evidence that the trait is highly 
polygenic. 
Next,  we  examine  whether  we  can  identify  individual  SNPs  that  predict  economic  and 
political preferences. For none of the eleven traits did we identify any SNPs that pass the 
conventional genome-wide significance threshold of p < 5  10
-8 (McCarthy et al., 2008). 
The standard diagnostic for population stratification (i.e., ethnic confounding) in GWAS is 
inflated test statistics in the QQ-plot (e.g., Pearson and Manolio, 2008); there is no evidence 
of  inflated  test  statistics  across  the  traits,  with  estimated  lambdas  in  the  range  0.987 
(economic policy attitudes) to 1.023 (educational attainment), suggesting that our controls for 8 
 
population structure worked well. The lowest p-value we observe is also for the economic 
policy attitude variable, with one SNP attaining a p-value of 8.7  10
-8. In the supplementary 
materials, we provide details on the full set of SNPs with p-values below 5  10
-6, but we are 
sceptical that any of these associations will be replicable, given the relatively high p-values. 
Finally, we examine the aggregate, out-of-sample predictive power of the SNPs. Following 
Purcell et al. (2009), we first estimate the regression coefficient for each SNP in a discovery 
set. From this set of coefficients, we form a prediction equation based on a pruned set of 
107,360 markers that includes only SNPs that are approximately in linkage equilibrium (to 
avoid double counting SNPs that are correlated with other SNPs). In a validation sample, we 
evaluate  the  correlation  between  individuals’  predicted  phenotype  and  their  observed 
phenotype. We do not find any significant out-of-sample predictability for any of the traits, 
and for most phenotypes, the explanatory power of the predictor is well below R
2 = 0.1%. 
These results are reported in Table 4. 
Discussion 
The data reported here reveal a number of descriptive facts about the heritability and genetic 
architecture of political and economic preferences. First, we report sibling correlations for 
several  traits,  some  of  which  have  never  before  been  studied  in  large  samples,  and  we 
confirm  that  there  is  a  robust  separation  of  the  MZ  and  DZ  correlations.  We  obtain 
heritability estimates that are consistent with typical estimates previously been reported for 
both political attitudes (Alford et al., 2005; Hatemi et al., 2007) and economic preferences 
(Cesarini et al., 2009, 2010, 2011; Zhong et al., 2009), as well as educational attainment 
(Miller, Mulvey and Martin, 2001). Our estimates for income are actually a little higher than 
what  has  previously been reported in  Swedish  data (Björklund,  Jäntti, and Solon,  2005). 
Overall,  these  results  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  there  exists  a  moderate 
correlation between genotype and the eleven phenotypes. A plausible conjecture is that the 
lower heritabilities of the economic preferences relative to the political preferences result 
from  attenuation  bias  due  to  greater  measurement  error,  as  evidenced  by  their  lower 
reliabilities. 
Second, our molecular-genetic-based estimates of heritability partially corroborate the twin-
based estimates and suggest that molecular genetic data could be predictive of preferences. 9 
 
When we estimate the cumulative effect of genotyped SNPs using the method of Yang et al. 
(2010), we find that the estimated heritabilities are lower than the twin-based estimates, but 
the overall pattern of results suggests that heritabilities are generally positive. Previous papers 
on height (Yang et al., 2010) and intelligence (Davies et al., 2011) have found that the SNP-
based heritability estimates are about half the size of the twin-study estimates. These papers 
have interpreted the gap as indicating that genotyped SNPs tag approximately half the genetic 
variation in those traits. The gap may also reflect an upward bias in twin-based estimates of 
narrow heritability estimates due to environmental confounding or non-additive variation, 
both  of which will cause an upward bias in  the estimated additive genetic proportion of 
variance. Consistent with the interpretation that some of the gap is due to bias, behaviour-
genetic  heritability  estimates  for  income  and  education  based  on  non-twin  siblings,  for 
example  adoptees  and  full  siblings,  are  somewhat  lower  than  those  based  on  twins 
(Björklund, Jänti and Solon, 2005, Cesarini, 2010). 
Do economic and political preferences parallel height and intelligence in having SNP-based 
heritabilities that are about half the size as the twin-study estimates? If so, it would suggest 
that economic and political preferences have a similar genetic architecture, a similar degree 
of  bias  in  twin-based  estimates,  or  both.  Since  the  economic  and  political  preference 
measures have twin-based heritabilities around 0.30 (Beauchamp et al., 2011; Benjamin et 
al,. 2011; Cesarini et al., 2009) and 0.40 (see Table 1), respectively, the hypotheses would be 
GREML point estimates of around 0.15 and 0.20. Our evidence, considered in its entirety, is 
not inconsistent with these hypotheses, but the point estimates are quite noisy. An alternative 
approach is to examine the number of statistically significant associations. For economic 
preferences, if the SNP-based heritability parameter in the population is 0.15, and if sample 
estimates  have  a  standard  error  of  0.15  (as  suggested  by  Table  2),  then  our  power  to 
statistically reject the null hypothesis of zero heritability in a one-sided test at the five percent 
level is about 26%. For political attitudes, if we assume a SNP-based heritability parameter in 
the population of 0.20, and we assume a standard error of 0.15 (again as suggested by Table 
2), then the corresponding statistical  power is  about  38%.  If the traits  are independently 
distributed, this calculation implies that for the nine preference variables, we should expect to 
observe  2.9  significant  associations  at  the  five  percent  level.  In  fact,  we  observe  three 
significant associations at the five percent level and one more at the eight percent level. The 
results, therefore, are close to what one would expect under the hypothesis that the SNP-
based heritability estimates are about half the magnitude of the twin-based estimates.¶ 10 
 
Third, our analysis of individual SNPs does not reveal any associations that are significant at 
the  conventional  threshold  of  genome-wide  significance  required  in  genetic  association 
studies. This is unsurprising in light of the accumulating evidence that the effects of common 
variants on complex outcomes are small (Visscher, 2008), especially in the context of social 
science  traits  (Beauchamp  et  al.,  2011;  Benjamin  et  al.,  2011).  Figure  1  displays  power 
calculations, given the SALTY sample size, for detecting true associations across a range of 
effect sizes as measured by the R
2. For the preference measures, the study was well-powered 
to  detect  individual  markers  which  explain  at  least  1.5%  of  trait  variation  at  a  nominal 
significance  level  of  8    10
-8—yet  no  single  SNP  in  our  sample  attains  this  level  of 
significance in our sample. Moreover, 1.5% is an upper bound to the effect sizes we can rule 
out because: (1) since 8  10
-8 is the smallest of many millions of p-values we estimated, it 
almost  surely  capitalizes  on  chance  to  some  extent  and  overstates  the  strongest  genetic 
association in  our data  (the well-known “winner’s  curse” in  statistical  inference;  Garner, 
2007);  and  (2)  for  many  of  the  variables,  the  lowest  observed  p-value  was  considerably 
higher than 8  10
-8. To illustrate our statistical power another way, if across the nine traits 
there are a total of twenty independently-distributed SNPs each with R
2 of 0.75%, our study 
was extremely well-powered to detect at least one of them—and yet we found none. We 
conclude that is unlikely that many markers with such effect sizes exist. Hence our failure to 
detect associations at these levels of significance indicates that true associations between 
common SNPs and economic and political phenotypes are likely to have very small effect 
sizes.    
Fourth, the results from our prediction exercise show that in a sample of approximately 4,000 
individuals, a standard polygenic risk score has negligible out-of-sample predictability. This 
does not in any way contradict the results from the GREML analysis. GREML uses the 
measured SNPs  to  estimate realized relatedness  between individuals,  and given the large 
number  of  SNPs  in  a  dense  SNP  array,  realized  relatedness  can  be  estimated  relatively 
precisely. In contrast, estimating a prediction equation that can predict well out of sample 
requires precise estimates of the effects of individual SNPs. In the limit of an infinite sample, 
it would be possible to perfectly estimate the effects of individual SNPs and thereby construct 
a polygenic risk score whose predictive power reaches the theoretical upper bound that is 
estimated by GREML.  The smaller the discovery sample used to  estimate the prediction 
equation, the noisier are the estimates of the individual SNP effects, and hence the lower will 11 
 
be the out-of-sample predictive power of the polygenic risk score that is constructed based on 
these estimates. Evidently a discovery sample of 4,000 individuals is far too small to obtain 
even  mildly  useful  predictive  power  for  standard  measures  of  economic  or  political 
preferences. 
These findings fit in nicely with an emerging consensus in medical genetics, according to 
which common SNPs that explain a substantial share of the variation in complex traits are 
unlikely  to  exist.  If  anything,  the  problem  is  likely  to  be  even  more  acute  in  the  social 
sciences, since the phenotypes are usually several degrees removed from genes in the chain 
of causation (Benjamin et al., 2007, 2011; Beauchamp et al., 2011). Our results suggest that 
much of the “missing heritability” (Manolio et al,. 2009)—the gulf between the explanatory 
power of genetic variants identified to date and the heritability as estimated in behaviour-
genetic studies—for social science traits reflects the fact that these traits have a complicated 
genetic architecture with thousands of SNPs exerting small effects. If the genetic architecture 
of social science traits involves many genetic variants with small effects, then large samples 
will be needed to detect those variants.** 
These conclusions have a number of implications for research at the intersection of genetics 
and social science. There has recently been an explosion of reported associations in samples 
of several hundred individuals (for reviews of work to date, see Ebstein et al., 2010, and 
Beauchamp et al., 2011). These samples are very small by the standards of medical genetics, 
often based on samples in the hundreds or less. Such studies are only adequately powered if 
the  R
2  is  considerably  larger  than  the  upper  bounds  established  by  the  GWAS  findings 
reported here. Our findings, based on a sample an order of magnitude larger, suggest that 
adequate power actually requires a sample size that is yet an order of magnitude larger even 
than  ours.  Statistically  significant  associations  obtained  in  a  small  sample  should  be 
approached  with  caution  for  two  reasons:  (1)  since  most  existing  published  studies  are 
dramatically underpowered, the probability that an association study will detect a true signal 
is vanishingly small; hence if a significant association is observed, Bayesian calculations 
indicate that the posterior odds of a true association are low (Benjamin, 2010; Beauchamp et 
al., 2011); and (2) publication bias—the tendency for findings, as opposed to non-findings, to 
be selectively reported by researchers and selectively published by journals—are magnified 
in genetic association work because the typical dataset has many behavioral measures and 
many genetic markers (Hewitt, 2011). 12 
 
Our  conclusions  regarding  the  molecular  genetic  architecture  of  economic  and  political 
preferences  also  have  implications  for  whether,  how,  and  how  soon  molecular  genetic 
information  can  contribute  to,  and  potentially  transform,  research  in  social  science.  One 
possibility is that genetic associations may shed light on biological pathways of precursors to 
important behaviors and outcomes, such as preferences. More speculatively, such insights 
may also help inspire the development of new theoretical constructs which are more closely 
aligned with the underlying biology than the existing concepts such as “risk preference” or 
“time preference” that we study here (Benjamin et al., 2007). Contributions such as these 
require the identification of specific genetic variants that correlate robustly with behavior. As 
discussed above, the results reported here suggest the need to construct samples which are 
several orders of magnitude larger than those presently employed in this sort of research. 
Another interesting potential contribution to economics and political science would be the use 
of genetic markers as instrumental variables in (non-genetic) empirical work. In order for the 
gene-as-instrument to be convincing, not only must the marker be robustly associated with 
the “endogenous regressor,” but all of the behaviors associated with that marker must be 
understood. Otherwise, if the marker has pleiotropic effects, then the exclusion-restriction 
assumption may be violated, making the marker invalid as an instrumental variable. It will 
take  a  long  time  to  accumulate  the  evidence  required  to  demonstrate  with  reasonable 
confidence that a given genetic marker mostly operates through a particular causal pathway. 
A different potential use of molecular genetic data to social science would be as control 
variables for genetic heterogeneity in (non-genetic) empirical work, in order to reduce the 
variance of the error term and shrink the standard errors of coefficient estimates. For such an 
application to have any practical utility, the markers that are selected as controls need to 
explain  a  non-negligible  share  of  the  variation.  Similarly,  use  of  genetic  data  to  target 
interventions requires that the aggregate predictive power of a set of genetic variants for the 
trait be sufficiently large. As we have shown here, given presently-attainable sample sizes, 
this  does  not  appear  to  be  feasible  for  economic  and  political  traits.   It  is  likely  that 
extremely large—perhaps impossibly large—samples will be required. If so, some of the 
most exciting possible uses of molecular genetic data in the social sciences lie many years in 
the future. 13 
 
In summary, our molecular-genetic-based estimates of heritability partially corroborate the 
twin-based  estimates  and  suggest  that  molecular  genetic  data  could  be  predictive  of 
preferences. Our other results, however, suggest that excitement about the utility of molecular 
genetic data in social science research likely needs to be tempered by an appreciation that 
much of that the heritable variation is likely explained by a large number of markers, each 
with a small effect in terms of variance explained. As a consequence, for economic and 
political preferences, much larger samples than currently used will be required to robustly 
identify  individual  SNP  associations  or  sizeable  predictive  power  from  many  SNPs 
considered jointly.  
Rather  than  being  destructive  to  the  enterprise  of  incorporating  genetic  data  into  social 
science,  an  understanding  the  molecular  genetic  architecture  of  economic  and  political 
preferences can help guide research in more productive directions. Indeed, there are several 
constructive and complementary responses one might imagine to the inferential challenges 
posed by the genetic architecture documented here. One is to undertake efforts to actually 
obtain  very  large  samples  that  contain  both  genetic  and  social  science  data.  A  second 
response is to carefully evaluate the psychometric properties of social science phenotypes to 
minimize attenuation bias due to error in measurement and thereby maximize power for any 
given sample size.  In our view, the larger GREML estimates for the  political preference 
measures relative to the less reliable economic measures phenotypes illustrates these potential 
gains. A third suggestion is to focus on traits that are more biologically proximate, where it is 
more  likely  that  any  associations  have  non-trivial  effect  sizes  and  biologically  plausible 
interpretations. 
Materials and Methods 
 
Between  December  2010  and  May  2011,  10,946  Swedish  Twins  were  genotyped  by  the 
SNP&SEQ  Technology  Platform,  Uppsala,  using  the  Illumina  HumanOmniExpress 
BeadChip genotyping platform. A total of 79,893 SNPs were omitted because their minor 
allele frequency was lower than 0.01; 3,071 markers were excluded because they failed a test 
of Hardy Weinberg equilibrium at p < 10
–7; and 3,922 SNPs were dropped because of a 
missingness greater than 3%. IMPUTE Version 2 (Howie et al., 2009) was used to impute all 14 
 
autosomal SNPs on HapMap, using the publicly-available phased haplotypes from HapMap2 
(release 22, build 36, CEU population) as a reference panel. 
 
As part of the quality control, one of the authors (van der Loos) conducted a careful analysis 
designed  to  detect  pedigree  errors.  We  estimated  the  proportion  of  genome-wide  allele 
sharing among all pairs of individuals in the dataset by calculating mean identity-by-descent 
across a set of 547 randomly selected markers, selected to have a minor allele frequency of at 
least 0.20. Inspection revealed a small number of pairs (n = 38) with misclassified zygosity; 
we  corrected  this  misclassification.  We  also  detected  a  small  number  of  inconsistencies 
which were corrected. All molecular genetic analyses reported in the paper are based on the 
dataset with respondents who are cryptically related removed from the sample.  
 
The principal components of the genotypic data were computed using EIGENSTRAT (Price 
et al., 2006). We used the program smartpca of the EIGENSTRAT software to calculate the 
principal components of the genotypic data from a subsample of 6,813 unrelated individuals 
and to  project  the other individuals  in  the sample onto  those principal components,  thus 
obtaining the loadings of each individual on each of the top 10 principal components. We 
dropped individuals whose score is at least six standard deviations from the mean on one of 
the top ten principal components. 
 
We computed the GREML estimates using the publicly-available GCTA software (Yang et 
al., 2011). Before computing the matrix of genetic relatedness for the SALTY sample, we 
dropped one twin per pair, always the twin with a larger number of missing phenotypes. If the 
same number of observations were available for both twins, we selected one randomly. After 
restricting the genotypic data to the selected individuals, we performed additional quality 
control: we dropped 6 SNPs because they failed a test of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium at p < 
1×10
-6; excluded 629 SNPs with a minor allele frequency lower than 0.01; and removed 2 
SNPs because of a missingness greater than 5%. 4 individuals were dropped because more 
than 1% of their genotypic data were missing. The pairwise genetic relationships were then 
estimated from 628,599 autosomal SNPs. We used the same matrix of genetic relatedness for 
all the SALTY phenotypes. The matrix of genetic relatedness for the larger, administrative-
record-based  sample  was  estimated  in  a  similar  way:  before  computing  the  matrix,  we 
randomly  dropped  one  twin  per  pair  and  performed  additional  quality  control  of  the 
genotypic  data.    A  total  of  48  SNP  were  dropped  because  they  failed  a  test  of  Hardy-15 
 
Weinberg equilibrium at p < 1×10
-6; 249 SNPs with a minor allele frequency lower than 0.01 
were excluded; and 13 individuals were omitted because more than 1% of their genotypic 
data  were  missing.  The  matrix  of  genetic  relatedness  was  then  estimated  from  628,922 
autosomal SNPs. We used the same matrix for both educational attainment and income. In all 
our GREML analyses, we control for the first ten principal components, sex and year of birth. 
 
Our individual-SNP analyses are based on the imputed data. In all our GWAS analyses, we 
control for the first ten principal components of the genotypic data, sex and age. The standard 
errors are adjusted for the non-independence of the residuals within twins using the fastAssoc 
function in the software Merlin Offline. The software assumes a behavior genetic AE model 
for the distribution of the error terms within family. SNPs with an imputation quality (info 
measure from IMPUTE) smaller than 0.4 or a minor allele frequency smaller than 0.01 were 
dropped. Genomic control (Devlin and Roeder, 1999) was used to adjust the test statistics for 
inflation due to any remaining population stratification. 
 
For our prediction exercise we use the non-imputed data with the same filters as the pre-
imputation quality controls previously described. We randomly split the sample into a 80% 
training sample and a 20% validation sample, randomizing at the level of the family to ensure 
non-independence  across  samples.  We  ran  linkage-disequilibrium-based  pruning  of  the 
validation sample using the software PLINK. Following Purcell et al.  (2009), we used a 
linkage disequilibrium threshold of 0.2 with a 200-SNP window that slides by 25 SNP. The 
process  started  with  643,826  markers  and  left  us  with  107,360  markers  which  are 
approximately in linkage equilibrium. For each phenotype in turn, we then constructed the 
polygenic risk score for each individual in the validation sample. The polygenic risk score is 
defined  as  the  sum  of  the  estimated  regression  coefficients  (from  a  regression  of  the 
phenotype on each SNP within the training sample) multiplied by the number of reference 
alleles. If a genotype in the score is missing for a particular individual, then the expected 
value is imputed based on the sample allele frequency. Finally, within the validation sample, 
we regressed the phenotype on the polygenic risk score, controlling for the number of non-
missing SNPs. 
 
Footnotes 
 
* For critical perspectives, see Conley (2009) and Cawley et al. (2011). 16 
 
 Another approach is to estimate the genetic variance from within-family variation in genetic 
relatedness (see Visscher et al., 2006). The estimates derived from such an analysis are 
unbiased estimates of heritability rather than lower bounds because the identical-by-descent 
probabilities for all variants, including the rare ones not tagged by the genotyped SNPs or 
microsatellites, can be inferred if one has sibling data. 
 Additional details on variable construction and materials and methods are available in the 
Online Supplementary Materials. 
§ Labor economists usually study earnings because it is taken to be a proxy for productivity. 
This assumption is most reasonable in prime aged males, whose attachment to the labor 
market tends to be strong and who typically work full time, making variation in hours worked 
less of a confound for measuring productivity. For a discussion of the difficulties with 
analyzing female labor supply and earnings, see Heckman and Killingsworth (1986). 
¶The fact that we observe some GREML point estimates of zero is not surprising. Since the 
estimator is constrained to produce a non-negative estimate, the bound at zero will often be 
attained when the true population parameter is low and estimated imprecisely. 
 While the survey measures we use here are common in economics (e.g., Barsky et al., 
1997), it is also common in economics to measure preferences using laboratory tasks that 
attach financial incentives to performance (Hertwig and Ortmann, 1998). It is sometimes 
argued that these incentivized laboratory tasks produce measures of preferences that are more 
reliable and more correlated with real-world behaviour than the survey measures. In fact, 
however, existing work does not support the hypothesis that such incentivized measures of 
risk aversion or other preferences are measured more reliably than survey-based measures 
(Beauchamp et al., 2011; Lönnkvist et al., 2011). Moreover, our conclusion that effects of 
individual SNPs on risk preferences are very small would hold even with measures of 
preferences were much more reliable than those we use. For example, suppose we could 
improve the reliability of one of the measures from 0.58 (the average reliability across our 
four economic preference measures) to 0.80. Then the upper bound of 1.5% that we calculate 
would imply an upper bound of 2.07% for this better-measured phenotype.  
** While we have emphasized the possibility that the heritability of preferences is composed 
of many common SNPs of small effect, we also note that the common SNPs (the heritable 
variation measured on dense SNP arrays) do not tag all the heritable variation in the genome. 
If the twin-based estimates of heritability are correct, then rare, perhaps non-SNP, causal 
variants that are not in close linkage disequilibrium with the genotyped markers may explain 
some of the heritable variation. If such variants exist, they may have large effects. 
Nonetheless, since such variants will be rare, large samples will also be required for adequate 
power to detect those markers. 
 Were it the case that economic behaviors, or their precursors in the form of various 
preferences, traits and skills, could be predicted from molecular genetic information, it would 
raise a host of ethical questions about if and how such information should be used. In 
principle, the information may be used to help people make more informed decisions. For 
example, if dyslexia could be predicted at a relatively early age, such information could in 
principle be used to help parents make better information about treatment strategies 
(Benjamin, 2010). Such potential benefits must of course be carefully weighed against the 
costs. For example, insurance markets may break down due to adverse selection (Benjamin et 
al., 2007) unless there are restrictions placed on the availability of genetic data. 
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Table 1: Sibling Correlations 
  Economic Outcomes    Economic Preferences    Political Preferences 
   
Education 
 
Income 
 
Risk 
 
Time 
 
Social 
 
Trust 
Imm./ 
Crime 
Econ. 
Policy 
 
Environ. 
 
Femin. 
Foreign 
Policy 
ρ MZM  0.70 
(.65-.75) 
0.47 
(.31-.61) 
0.41 
(.33-.49) 
0.05 
(-.04-.15) 
0.32 
(.23-.42) 
0.37 
(.29-.45) 
0.56 
(.49 -.62) 
0.42 
(.34-.50) 
0.26 
(.17-.34) 
0.48 
(.40-.57) 
0.48 
(.40-.54) 
ρ DZM  0.50 
(.42-.57) 
0.22 
(.11-.33) 
0.20 
(.12-.28) 
0.07 
(-.04-.20) 
0.24 
(.15-.33) 
0.18 
(.08-.27) 
0.33 
(.25-.42) 
0.34 
(.26-.42) 
0.09 
(.01-0.18) 
0.27 
(.19-.35) 
0.16 
(.07-.24) 
ρ MZF  0.74 
(.70-.78) 
0.37 
(.25-.50) 
0.35 
(.27-.43) 
0.16 
(.07-.25) 
0.24 
(.16-.32) 
0.33 
(.25-.40) 
0.60 
(.55-.65) 
0.45 
(.37-.51) 
0.34 
(.23-.46) 
0.41 
(.34-.48) 
0.47 
(.39-.53) 
ρ DZF  0.54 
(.49-.59) 
0.22 
(.14-.32) 
0.13 
(.05-.21) 
0.11 
(.03-.20) 
0.10 
(.03-.17) 
0.19 
(.11-.26) 
0.37 
(.29-.44) 
0.22 
(.14-.29) 
0.16 
(.09-.24) 
0.19 
(.12-.26) 
0.21 
(.14-.29) 
N MZM  561  560  443  491  450  458  448  448  448  448  448 
N DZM  614  612  477  655  482  486  487  487  487  487  487 
N MZF  544  538  594  700  652  659  630  630  630  630  630 
N DZF  845  815  636  1108  681  714  665  665  665  665  665 
ρRETEST  -  -  0.71 
(.66-.76) 
0.40 
(.27-.52) 
0.57 
(.49-.65) 
0.63 
(.57-.69) 
0.86  
(.84-.88) 
0.84  
(.84-.88) 
0.62  
(.84-.88) 
0.78  
(.84-.88) 
0.72  
(.84-.88) 
NRETEST  -  -  475  483  469  482  471  471  471  471  471 
Note: This table gives the sibling and retest Pearson correlations for the eleven phenotypes. The 95% confidence intervals given in parentheses are computed by bootstrapping with 500 draws.  
MZM: number of male monozygotic pairs; DZM: male dizygotic pairs; MZF: female monozygotic pairs; DZF: female dizygotic pairs.  19 
 
Table 2: GREML Analyses 
  Economic Outcomes    Economic Preferences    Political Preferences 
   
Education 
 
Income 
 
Risk 
 
Time 
 
Social 
 
Trust 
Imm./ 
Crime 
Econ. 
Policy 
 
Environ. 
 
Femin. 
Foreign 
Policy 
V(g)/V(P)    0.191  0.061  0.137  0.085  0.000  0.242  0.203  0.344  0.000  0.000  0.353 
s.e.  0.062  0.123  0.152  0.148  0.150  0.146  0.147  0.150  0.148  0.147  0.149 
p-value  0.001  0.313  0.186  0.285  0.500  0.047  0.079  0.012  0.500  0.500  0.001 
N  5682  2866  2327  2399  2376  2410  2368  2368  2368  2368  2368 
Chrom.  0.240  0.139  0.118  -0.195  -0.111  0.460  0.117  0.496  -0.311  0.247  0.462 
Note: This table reports GREML estimates for the eleven variables. We estimated the matrix of genetic relatedness after omitting one twin per pair and then restricted the analyses to individuals 
whose relatedness did not exceed 0.025 in absolute value. The row Chrom. shows the estimated correlation between chromosomal length (measured in centimorgan) and the proportion of variation 
explained by relatedness estimated from that chromosome. As explained in the text, the results for income are based exclusively on men. 
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Table 3: Results of Prediction Analysis 
  Economic Outcomes    Economic Preferences    Political Preferences 
   
Education 
 
Income 
 
Risk 
 
Time 
 
Social 
 
Trust 
Imm./ 
Crime 
Econ 
Policy 
 
Environ. 
 
Femin. 
Foreign 
Policy 
R
2  0.0012  0.0004  0.0004  0.0000  0.0018  0.0001  0.0007  0.0008  0.0002  0.0000  0.0024 
N  1875  888  634  657  654  663  653  653  653  653  653 
p-value  0.1934  0.5448  0.6268  0.9153  0.2593  0.9153  0.518  0.4871  0.7511  0.9577  0.2339 
Note: This table reports the results from the prediction analyses. Following Purcell et al. (2009), we constructed a polygenic risk score for each phenotype by splitting the sample into an 80% 
discovery sample and a 20% validation sample. The row N gives the number of individuals in the validation sample. The score is defined as the sum of the estimated regression coefficients multiplied 
by the number of reference alleles. If a genotype in the score is missing for a particular individual, then the expected value is imputed based on the sample allele frequency. Finally, we regressed the 
dependent variable on the score, controlling for the number of non-missing SNPs. The R2 is the incremental R2 obtained when adding the score as a regressor. The p-value is obtained from the Wald 
test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the polygenic risk score is zero. 
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Figure 1: Power Analysis 
 
This figure shows how the power to detect a marker at a nominal significance level of 8 10
-8
as a function of sample size and the fraction of 
variance (R
2
) explained by the marker. This p-value threshold was selected because no single SNP attained this level of nominal significance in 
any of the analyses. For educational attainment, there were 6,694 independent observations (i.e., from unrelated individuals) and a total of 9,749 
observations – the true power therefore lies somewhere in between the two lines shown. For the political preference measures, we had 2,567 
independent observations and a total of 3,233 observations. The true power again lies somewhere between the lines shown. Even for the 
preference variables, where the sample size is smaller, the study was well-powered to detect a marker with an R
2
 of 1.5% at a nominal 
significance level of 8  10
-8
. The fact that we did not observe any associations at this level of significance suggests that it is unlikely that 
common variants with effects of that magnitude exist. For several of the traits, the lowest p-values observed were considerably higher than 8  10
-
8
. Hence, the 1.5% estimate of the upper bound is conservative. For educational attainment and income, the study was well-powered to detect 
markers with an R
2
 of 0.6%.  22 
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Online Supplementary Materials: 
 
“The Genetic Architecture of Economic  
and Political Preferences” 
 
 
 
 
This document provides additional details about data and additional analyses to 
accompany the article “The Genetic Architecture of Economic and Political Preferences.” 
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AI.A. Risk Attitudes 
 
We  used  three  survey  measures  from  SALTY  to  construct  an  overall  index  of  risk 
attitudes.  The  first  measure  elicits  the  subjective  level  of  general  risk  taking  of  the 
individual: 
“How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks 
or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 
means ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means ‘fully prepared to take risks.’” 
The second measure is the same as the first, except it is specific to financial risks: 
“Are you a person who is fully prepared to take financial risks or do you try to avoid 
taking  financial  risks?  Please  tick  a  box  on  the  scale,  where  the  value  1  means 
‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means ‘fully prepared to take risks.’”   
These two measures have been used in the German Socioeconomic Panel (Dohmen et 
al., forthcoming), except with a 0-10 scale rather than the 1-10 scale used in SALTY. 
Our third measure of risk attitudes is adapted from the Health and Retirement Survey 
questions first described in Barsky et al. (1997).  Subjects answer three questions about 
hypothetical gambles. The first question is phrased: 
“Imagine  the  following  hypothetical  situation.  You  are  the  sole  provider  for  your 
household, and you have the choice between two equally good jobs: 
Job A will with certainty give you SEK 25,000 per month after taxes for the rest of your 
life. 32 
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Job B will give you a 50-50 chance of SEK 50,000 per month after taxes for the rest of 
your life, and a 50-50 chance of SEK 20,000 per month after taxes for the rest of your 
life. 
Which job do you choose?” 
The second and third questions are identical, except that instead of being SEK 20,000, 
the low-income outcome in job B is SEK 22,000 and SEK 17,000, respectively. For each 
subject, our third measure of risk-taking is the number of questions out of the three that 
the subject chose Job B (the risky job), generating a measure with a 0 (never choosing 
the  risky  job)  to  3  (always  choosing  the  risky  job).  (Only  2.6%  of  subjects  behave 
inconsistently in the sense of choosing job B in a question but choosing job A in another 
question that offers more money for job B; we retain these inconsistent subjects in the 
sample.) 
To combine our three measures of risk taking into an overall index, we calculate the z-
score for each of the three measures, and the index is defined as the average z-score. 33 
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AI.B. Time Preference 
To measure  the  rate of  time  preference,  we  used a  sequence  of  three  hypothetical 
choice questions from SALTY. Subjects were asked to choose between an amount of 
money today and a larger amount of money in one week. The first of these questions is 
phrased: 
“Imagine that you can choose between receiving a sum of money today, or to wait and 
receive a larger sum in one week. Which would you choose? 
SEK 5,000 today 
SEK 6,000 in a week”  
The second and third questions are identical, except that instead of being SEK 6,000, 
the delayed outcome is SEK 7,000 and SEK 5,500, respectively. For each subject, we 
calculate the number of questions out of the three that the subject chose the delayed 
outcome,  generating  a  variable  with  a  0  (never  choosing  the  delayed  reward)  to  3 
(always  choosing  the  delayed  reward)  scale.  (Only  1.1%  of  subjects  behave 
inconsistently in the sense of choosing job B in a question but choosing job A in another 
question that offers more money for job B; we retain these inconsistent subjects in the 
sample.) Our measure of patience is the z-score of this variable. 
Note that the questions ask about a short time horizon (one week) to get a proxy for 
short-term time discounting, which appears to be distinct from long-term discounting 
(e.g.,  Laibson,  1997)  and  responsible  for  many  impatient  behaviours  (DellaVigna, 
2009).  Similar  questions  (but  with  smaller  real  stakes)  are  used,  for  instance,  by 34 
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Benjamin et al. (2006); see also the survey by Frederick et al. (2001), who discuss this 
and other approaches of measuring time preferences.  35 
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AI.C. Trust 
 
To measure trust, we use two questions included in SALTY. Both are taken from the 
National  Opinion  Research  Center’s  General  Social  Survey  (GSS),  except  that  they 
SALTY questions use a 10-point scale instead of a binary scale. The first question is a 
classic measure of trust used widely in political science (Nannestad, 2008) and other 
social sciences: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people? Please tick on the scale below, where the value 
1  means  ‘need  to  be  very  careful’  and  the  value  10  means  ‘most  people  can  be 
trusted.’”  
We also included a second question from the GSS: 
“Do  you  think  that  most  people  would  try  to  take  advantage  of  you  if  they  got  the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? Please tick on the scale below, where the value 0 
means ‘would take advantage of me’ and the value 10 means ‘would treat me fairly.’” 
For each subject, we calculate the z-score for each response to the two questions, and 
we use the average z-score as our index of trust. Glaeser et al. (2000) used the above 
two trust questions (as well as a third question not asked in SALTY)  and provide a 
thorough discussion about different measures of trust.   36 
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AI.D. Fairness 
 
To measure attitudes about fairness we used three survey questions in SALTY, which 
are adapted from Kahneman et al. (1986, their question 1, question 4A, and question 
11B): 
 
“A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for SEK 150. The morning after a 
large snowstorm, the store raises the price to SEK 200. How fair do you think that is? 
Completely fair 
Acceptable 
Unfair 
Very unfair” 
 
“A company is making a small profit. However, due to a recession, unemployment is 
high, and it is easy to hire people. The company therefore decides to decrease wages 
and salaries by 10% for all its employees. How fair do you think that is? 
Completely fair 
Acceptable 
Unfair 
Very unfair” 
 37 
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“A small factory is making kitchen tables. Because of changes in the price of materials, 
the cost of making each table has decreased by SEK 200. But the factory does not 
lower its price for the tables. How fair do you think that is? 
Completely fair 
Acceptable 
Unfair 
Very unfair” 
 
We coded the responses from 1 (completely fair) to 4 (very unfair) for each question, 
and we summed the answers from the three questions. We then use the z-score of this 
variable as our index of fairness attitudes. 38 
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AI.E. Political Attitudes 
 
We measure political attitudes using a battery of 34 questions included in SALTY that 
elicit attitudes towards various policy issues. These items have also been included in 
other Swedish surveys, such as the Swedish Election studies. On each question the 
respondents rate their attitude towards a policy on a 5-point scale from (1) “very good 
proposal” to (5) “very bad proposal.” The battery of questions is reproduced below. 
 
Below is a table with proposals some people think should be implemented in 
Sweden. State what you think about each of these proposals.  
 
  
Very 
good 
proposal 
Fairly 
good 
propos
al 
Neither 
good or 
bad 
proposal  
Fairly 
bad 
proposal 
Very bad 
proposal 
  1             
1.  2  Decrease the public sector           
2.  Decrease defense 
expenses 
                       
3.  Decrease welfare benefits                         39 
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4.  Decrease taxes           
5.  Keep property taxes           
6.  Sell public companies to 
private buyers 
         
7.  Decrease income inequality 
in society 
         
8.  Have more private 
companies in health care 
         
9.  Decrease the influence of 
financial markets on politics  
         
10
. 
Keep the ”maxtaxa” in 
daycare 
         
11
. 
Have more private schools           
12
. 
Introduce grades earlier in 
school 
         
13
. 
Increase the economic 
support to rural areas 
         40 
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14
. 
Introduce 6-hour working 
day for all employees 
         
15
. 
Forbid all kinds of 
pornography 
         
16
. 
Limit the right to free 
abortion 
         
17
. 
Introduce much harder 
punishments for criminals  
         
18
. 
Strengthen animal rights 
         
19
. 
Sweden should in the long 
run carry through a nuclear 
phase-out 
         
20
. 
Stop motoring in the inner 
city  
         
21
. 
Invest more to prevent 
environmental damages 
         
 
 
            22
. 
3  Decrease carbon dioxide 
emissions 
         41 
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23
. 
Increase labor immigration 
to Sweden 
                       
24
. 
Introduce a language test 
to become a Swedish 
citizen 
                       
25
. 
Decrease foreign aid           
26
. 
Accept fewer refugees in 
Sweden 
         
27
. 
Increase the economic 
support to immigrants so 
that they can preserve their 
own culture 
         
28
. 
Remit debt to developing 
countries 
         
29
. 
Give private companies 
more freedom 
         
30
. 
Sveden should leave the 
EU 
         42 
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31
. 
Sweden should introduce 
the EURO 
         
32
. 
Sweden should become 
members in NATO 
         
33
. 
Sweden should work for 
increased free trade all 
over the world 
         
34
. 
Sweden should actively 
support the US war on 
terrorism 
         
 
83.4% of subjects responded to all 34 questions, and 97% responded to at least 29. We 
dropped  the  3%  of  subjects  who  answered  fewer  than  29  questions,  and  for  the 
subjects  we  retained,  we  replaced  missing  values  by  the  question-specific  sample 
mean. We factor-analyzed the items, retaining five factors, and performed a varimax 
rotation of the data (Kaiser, 1958). An inspection of the factor loadings shows that the 
first factor can be interpreted as an “immigration factor,” the second as an “economic 
policy  factor,”  the  third  as  “environmentalism  factor,”  the  fourth  as  an  “international 
affairs,” factor and the last as a “feminism and inequality” factor. The table below reports 
the rotated factor loadings with the highest absolute value of each factor. The factor 
structure is similar to what has previously been reported for this scale (Oskarsson et al., 
2010; Statistics Sweden, 2008). 43 
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Table S1: Factor Structure of Political Attitudes Battery. 
  Questions With Highest 
Loading 
Interpretation 
Factor 1  23,24,25,26,27  Immigration 
Factor 2  1,4,6,8,11  Economic Policy 
Factor 3  18,19,20,21,22  Environmentalism 
Factor 4  19,30,31,32,33  Foreign Policy 
Factor 5  7,13,14,15,18  Feminism & Inequality 
Note: For each of the factors, this table show the five rotated factor loadings that are highest in absolute value. 44 
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AI.F. Educational Attainment 
 
Our measure  of educational attainment  is obtained from  subjects’ responses  on  the 
1990  Swedish  census.  The  original census  variable  is categorical and  takes  one of 
seven distinct values. Each category corresponds to a highest educational attainment 
level,  ranging  from  minimum  compulsory  schooling  to  postgraduate  education.  We 
assign to each category the population average of the number of years of schooling, as 
estimated by Isacsson (2004).  45 
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AI.G. Income 
 
Our income variable is obtained from the 1985 and 1990 Swedish census data. The 
variable (arbetsinkomst) is defined as the income from work, including self-employment 
and sickness and child benefits. To test robustness to alternative ways of measuring 
income, we create two income measures. 
Our  first  income  measure  is  the  average  across  the  two  years  of  the  logarithm  of 
income.  Our  second  income  measure  is  defined  the  same  way,  but  we  discard 
observations below SEK 40,000. This restriction is in order to restrict the sample to 
individuals who are plausibly working full time (cf., Isacsson, 2004). For both measures, 
when income data are present in both years, we average income across the two years 
in order to smooth out some of the transitory fluctuations. We use income from only one 
year when income from the other year is missing; this occurs for 5.5% of the subjects 
for  the  first  measure  and  11.3%  for  the  second  measure.  As  explained  in  the 
manuscript,  our  main  specification  uses  the  first  income  measure  and  restricts  the 
sample to males. 
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AII.A. Sample Definitions 
 
The first sample we use is the SALTY sample. SALTY is a survey administered by the Swedish Twin Registry between 
2008 and 2010 to twins born between 1943 and 1958. The response rate from contacted individuals was 47.1%, leaving a 
sample of 11,743 subjects. Of these, 11,418 (97.2%) gave informed consent to have their answers stored and analyzed. 
In addition, 491 respondents answered the survey twice (out of 800 contacted a second time). Cesarini et al. (2011) 
contains an analysis of non-response both to the original survey and to the re-test survey. We refer to the SALTY re-test 
respondents as SALTY Retest.  
The second sample is TwinGene, a sample of 10,946 twins born between 1926 and 1958 who have been genotyped 
using the Illumina HumanOmniExpress BeadChip genotyping platform. The TwinGene and SALTY samples partly 
overlap; 4,040 SALTY respondents are also in TwinGene. We refer to these genotyped SALTY twins as SALTY-Geno. 
The SALTY respondents who are not in SALTY-Geno have not been genotyped. 
The economic and political preference data are available from the survey administered to the SALTY sample (and 
administered twice to the SALTY Retest sample). These data are not available for the TwinGene sample, except for those 
in SALTY-Geno. Data on educational attainment and income are available for nearly all members of the TwinGene 47 
  47 
sample, as these variables are drawn from administrative records (and hence do not require participation in the SALTY 
survey).  
 48 
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AII.B. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table S2: Summary Statistics 
  Economic 
Outcomes 
  Economic Preferences    Political Preferences 
   
Education 
 
Income 
 
Risk 
 
Time 
 
Fairness 
 
Trust 
Imm./ 
Crime 
Econ. 
Policy 
 
Environ. 
 
Femin. 
Foreign 
Policy 
SALTY  - 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
-0.02 
(1.00) 
-0.00 
(1.00) 
-0.00 
(1.00) 
-0.00 
(1.00) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
-0.01 
(1.00) 
-0.02 
(1.00) 
-0.01 
(1.00) 
N  -  -  10,788  11,187  11,045  11,237  11,000  11,000  11,000  11,000  11,000 
SALTY-Geno  - 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
0.06 
(0.98) 
0.02 
(0.99) 
0.01 
(0.98) 
0.02 
(0.99) 
0.02 
(1.00) 
0.02 
(0.98) 
-0.04 
(0.99) 
-0.02 
(0.99) 
-0.00 
(0.97) 
N  -  -  3,818  3,970  3,922  3,986  3,886  3,886  3,886  3,886  3,886 
SALTY-
Retest 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
-0.00 
(0.98) 
-0.00 
(0.94) 
0.00 
(0.98) 
0.03 
(0.94) 
-0.10 
(0.98) 
-0.03 
(1.00) 
0.06 
(0.89) 
0.11 
(0.97) 
0.01 
(0.93) 
N  -  -  487  486  486  487  480  480  480  480  480 
TwinGene  11.05  6.95  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 49 
  49 
(2.83)  (0.76)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
N  10,793  10,669  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Note: This table reports sample summary statistics. Standard deviations in parentheses. We report the data for the entire SALTY sample, the subset of the SALTY sample 
which has been genotyped, and the entire TwinGene sample. The TwinGene sample only party overlaps with the SALTY sample, which is why the number of genotyped 
subjects with information on educational attainment and income is larger. The economic and political variables were standardized to have mean zero and variance one 
using all of SALTY as a standardization sample. 50 
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AIII.A. GREML Analyses Without Threshold for Genetic Relatedness 
 
Table S3: GREML Analyses, No Threshold 
  Economic Outcomes    Economic Preferences    Political Preferences 
   
Education 
 
Income 
 
Risk 
 
Time 
 
Fairness 
 
Trust 
Imm./ 
Crime 
Econ. 
Policy 
 
Environ. 
 
Femin. 
Foreign 
Policy 
V(g)/V(P)    0.187  0.000  0.157  0.040  0.000  0.258  0.207  0.294  0.000  0.000  0.344 
s.e.  0.053  0.108  0.139  0.134  0.136  0.134  0.134  0.139  0.135  0.132  0.138 
p-value  <0.001  0.499  0.130  0.385  0.500  0.026  0.058  0.019  0.500  0.497  0.006 
N  6,694  3,211  2,519  2,604  2,579  2,613  2,567  2,567  2,567  2,567  2,567 
                       
Chrom.  0.392      0.048  0.301  -0.170  -0.044  0.391  0.310  0.523  -0.110  0.186  0.554 
p-value  0.071  0.832  0.173  0.449  0.846  0.072  0.160  0.013  0.626  0.407  0.007 
Note: This table reports GREML estimates for the eleven variables. We estimated the matrix of genetic relatedness after omitting one twin per pair but did not impose a relatedness 
threshold before estimating the model. The row Chrom. shows the estimated correlation between chromosomal length (measured in centimorgan) and the proportion of variation 
explained by relatedness estimated from that chromosome. As explained in the text, the results for income are based exclusively on men. The third row gives the p-value for the 
test of the null hypothesis that the proportion of variation explained by common SNPs on the autosomes is zero. The sixth row gives the p-value for the test of the hypothesis that, 51 
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across the 22 autosomes, the correlation between chromosomal length and the proportion of variation explained by the chromosome is zero. 52 
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AIII.B. Additional GREML Analyses for Income 
 
Table S4: GREML Analyses, Additional Income Results 
  Men  Women  Pooled 
  Income 1  Income 2  Income 1  Income 2  Income 1  Income 2 
V(g)/V(P)  0.062  0.018  0.195  0.181  0.085  0.067 
s.e.  0.124  0.122  0.113  0.122  0.062  0.064 
p-value  0.313  0.439  0.037  0.068  0.084  0.143 
N  2,866  2,814  3,045  2,895  5,609  5,432 
             
Chrom.  0.139  0.532  0.060  0.266  0.089  0.245 
p-value  0.537  0.011  0.791  0.231  0.694  0.272 
Note: This table reports additional GREML estimates for income. We estimated the matrix of genetic 
relatedness after omitting one twin per pair and then restricted the analyses to individuals whose 
relatedness did not exceed 0.025. Income 1 is the average of the logarithm of income in the censuses of 
1985 and 1990. Income 2 is defined analogously but omitting observations below a threshold of SEK 
40,000.  The row Chrom. shows the estimated correlation between chromosomal length (measured in 53 
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centimorgan) and the proportion of variation explained by relatedness estimated from that chromosome. 
The third row gives the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the proportion of variation explained 
by common SNPs on the autosomes is zero. The sixth row gives the p-value for the test of the hypothesis 
that, across the 22 autosomes, the correlation between chromosomal length and the proportion of variation 
explained by the chromosome is zero.  54 
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AIV.A. Individual SNP Analyses 
 
Table S5: Top Hits from GWA of the Eleven Variables 
 
Chr.  SNP 
Effect 
allele  Gene  Function  Beta  SE  p-value  Phenotype 
2  rs10204325  T 
   
0.134  0.025  1.18×10
-7  Fairness 
11  rs11233413  T  RAB30  intronic  -0.108  0.021  3.53×10
-7  Feminism 
3  rs10937540  T 
   
-0.091  0.018  4.28×10
-7  Environmentalism 
3  rs6775909  T 
   
0.090  0.018  5.51×10
-7  Environmentalism 
18  rs41418949  T  NETO1  intronic  -0.358  0.072  5.86×10
-7  Time 
3  rs9821642  G 
   
-0.092  0.019  7.13×10
-7  Environmentalism 
2  rs436000  T 
   
0.125  0.025  8.03×10
-7  Fairness 
3  rs9820695  G 
   
0.091  0.019  8.54×10
-7  Environmentalism 
8  rs2299587  T  PCM1  intronic  -0.125  0.026  9.27×10
-7  Trust 
10  rs11203100  T  IFIT1L  5’ upstream  0.130  0.027  1.03×10
-6  Income 2 women 
3  rs4856162  G 
   
0.091  0.019  1.03×10
-6  Environmentalism 
3  rs1397924  T 
   
-0.092  0.019  1.03×10
-6  Environmentalism 
8  rs10112514  T  PCM1  intronic  -0.124  0.025  1.08×10
-6  Fairness 
10  rs2250149  T 
   
0.114  0.023  1.23×10
-6  Feminism 
3  rs7628767  G 
   
0.087  0.018  1.24×10
-6  Environmentalism 
3  rs4493441  G 
   
0.087  0.018  1.26×10
-6  Environmentalism 
18  rs8083633  T  DLGAP1  intronic  0.154  0.032  1.39×10
-6  Time 
14  rs4902960  G  RGS6  intronic  0.193  0.040  1.40×10
-6  Environmentalism 
6  rs210648  G  DCBLD1  intronic  -0.122  0.025  1.59×10
-6  Risk 
10  rs2250245  G 
   
-0.112  0.023  1.62×10
-6  Feminism 55 
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6  rs240768  T  ASCC3  coding  0.267  0.056  1.77×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
1  rs574773  T 
   
0.197  0.041  1.78×10
-6  Trust 
3  rs7612581  T 
   
0.088  0.018  1.89×10
-6  Environmentalism 
1  rs4384209  G  PDE4B  intronic  0.126  0.027  1.98×10
-6  Feminism 
18  rs1346987  C 
   
0.180  0.038  1.99×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
3  rs10511217  T 
   
-0.092  0.019  1.99×10
-6  Environmentalism 
3  rs12485744  T 
   
0.091  0.019  2.14×10
-6  Environmentalism 
17  rs2291447  T  ACBD4  5’ upstream  0.114  0.024  2.22×10
-6  Risk 
4  rs12499086  G 
   
-0.129  0.027  2.26×10
-6  Time 
4  rs11730243  T 
   
0.129  0.027  2.30×10
-6  Time 
6  rs6931919  C  ASCC3  intronic  -0.263  0.056  2.34×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
6  rs3213542  T  ASCC3  coding  -0.263  0.056  2.39×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
11  rs4944425  C  RAB30  intronic  -0.099  0.021  2.59×10
-6  Feminism 
11  rs7101446  T  SLC22A9  intronic  -0.145  0.031  2.71×10
-6  Economic policy 
12  rs2120771  G 
   
-0.107  0.023  2.72×10
-6  Feminism 
22  rs4823246  G 
   
-0.100  0.021  2.82×10
-6  Feminism 
13  rs7984869  T 
   
0.115  0.025  2.90×10
-6  Fairness 
14  rs12434047  G 
   
-0.127  0.027  2.94×10
-6  Fairness 
11  rs17504704  G  RAB30  intronic  -0.102  0.022  3.30×10
-6  Feminism 
3  rs13073838  T 
   
-0.116  0.025  3.30×10
-6  Economic policy 
18  rs8090196  T 
   
-0.179  0.038  3.35×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
17  rs2360111  T  NXN  intronic  -0.113  0.024  3.43×10
-6  Economic policy 
4  rs1850744  T 
   
0.305  0.066  3.56×10
-6  Risk 
18  rs7235528  T 
   
0.167  0.036  3.74×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
6  rs11969893  G 
   
0.324  0.070  4.06×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
2  rs3789119  T  ACOXL  intronic  -0.136  0.029  4.17×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
1  rs12125250  C 
   
-0.124  0.027  4.18×10
-6  Foreign Policy 
3  rs1682825  T 
   
-0.118  0.026  4.28×10
-6  Feminism 
18  rs12606301  G 
   
0.171  0.037  4.54×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
12  rs10772939  T 
   
-0.112  0.024  4.56×10
-6  Economic policy 
21  rs16998084  G 
   
-0.400  0.088  4.82×10
-6  Immigration / crime 56 
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10  rs4586057  T  RPP30  intronic  0.141  0.031  5.08×10
-6  Time 
12  rs10748180  G  THAP2  3’ utr  -0.123  0.027  5.14×10
-6  Time 
17  rs218676  G  SLC13A5  intronic  0.149  0.033  5.19×10
-6  Time 
11  rs470763  G 
   
0.113  0.025  5.24×10
-6  Fairness 
5  rs1978633  T  FBXL7  intronic  -0.090  0.020  5.40×10
-6  Feminism 
18  rs7231412  T 
   
0.170  0.037  5.67×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
13  rs7327064  T  SOHLH2  intronic  0.140  0.031  5.69×10
-6  Foreign Policy 
10  rs2904804  T  AKR1C1  intronic  0.117  0.026  5.69×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
3  rs10937544  C 
   
-0.088  0.019  5.74×10
-6  Environmentalism 
3  rs1488193  G  CD200R1  intronic  -0.230  0.051  5.80×10
-6  Economic policy 
3  rs13325751  T  CADPS  intronic  0.132  0.029  6.17×10
-6  Environmentalism 
14  rs1951681  G  AKAP6  intronic  0.194  0.043  6.17×10
-6  Environmentalism 
6  rs9267663  T  EHMT2  5’ upstream  -0.290  0.064  6.20×10
-6  Environmentalism 
2  rs12713280  T 
   
0.123  0.027  6.25×10
-6  Risk 
5  rs17376026  T 
   
-0.121  0.027  6.28×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
9  rs2226006  T  ASTN2  intronic  -0.111  0.025  6.45×10
-6  Fairness 
1  rs438895  G 
   
0.384  0.085  6.67×10
-6  Education 
14  rs10146615  T 
   
-0.138  0.031  6.71×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
3  rs16854884  C 
   
0.103  0.023  6.74×10
-6  Feminism 
10  rs1570854  T 
   
0.079  0.018  7.03×10
-6  Environmentalism 
7  rs1399090  T  PLXNA4  intronic  -0.216  0.048  7.06×10
-6  Foreign Policy 
7  rs2598202  T  PLXNA4  intronic  -0.216  0.048  7.06×10
-6  Foreign Policy 
22  rs117294  C 
   
0.110  0.025  7.08×10
-6  Fairness 
22  rs138597  G  LOC388910  3’ downstream  0.123  0.027  7.30×10
-6  Time 
14  rs3784178  T  AKAP6  intronic  -0.192  0.043  7.37×10
-6  Environmentalism 
1  rs10754644  G 
   
0.090  0.020  7.40×10
-6  Feminism 
3  rs13068298  T 
   
-0.102  0.023  7.71×10
-6  Feminism 
5  rs784420  G 
   
-0.120  0.027  7.85×10
-6  Trust 
6  rs9364813  G 
   
0.265  0.059  8.17×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
3  rs10511400  T  LRRC58  3’ utr  0.157  0.035  8.22×10
-6  Feminism 
12  rs11178918  G 
   
-0.184  0.041  8.32×10
-6  Time 57 
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2  rs12619788  G 
   
0.112  0.025  8.33×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
3  rs16831033  T  LRRC58  3’ downstream  -0.157  0.035  8.88×10
-6  Feminism 
1  rs9728717  T  EDG7  intronic  0.140  0.031  8.95×10
-6  Time 
9  rs4838320  T 
   
0.197  0.044  9.03×10
-6  Immigration / crime 
17  rs7209847  G  RICH2  intronic  -0.273  0.062  9.39×10
-6  Risk 
10  rs4282910  G  RPP30  5’ upstream  0.148  0.033  9.45×10
-6  Time 
6  rs228146  C  BMP5  intronic  0.109  0.025  9.95×10
-6  Time 
Note: This table reports the full set of SNPs with p <10
-5
 in the GWA analyses for political and economic preferences. Education and income results are not reported because these data are part of ongoing 
consortium meta-analyses, but none of the p-values for either trait are lower than 10
-7
. For 5’ upstream and 3’ downstream, the SNP is located within 2 kb from the UTR start or end. 58 
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AIV.B. Q-Q Plots for the Political Phenotypes  
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Note: These figures are quantile–quantile plots of the association analysis p-values from the GWA of the five political phenotypes. Genomic control was not applied.  60 
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AIV.C. Q-Q Plots for the Economic Phenotypes  
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Note: These figures are quantile–quantile plots of the association analysis p-values from the GWA of the economic phenotypes. Genomic control was not applied.  62 
  62 
AIV.C. Manhattan Plots for the Political Phenotypes  
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Note: Manhattan plots for the political phenotypes. 65 
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AIV.D. Manhattan Plots for the Economic Phenotypes  
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Note: Manhattan plots for the economic phenotypes. 68 
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